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INTRODUCTION 
Letters of intent (LOIs) are fundamental building blocks of many cor-
porate transactions. Although their form and terms vary, LOIs are used 
predominantly to communicate parties’ agreement to the basic structure of a 
deal and a mutual desire to continue negotiating.1 They are commonly 
called “agreements to agree” or, somewhat oxymoronically, “nonbinding 
agreements.”2 In almost every respect, these agreements are contracts—
except they aren’t supposed to be. They state that the parties agree, while 
also stating that the parties don’t agree yet. Under a traditional legal 
analysis, these agreements pose a problem: either there is an enforceable 
contract or there isn’t one. It’s no wonder that LOIs have been described as 
the contractual equivalent of being “almost pregnant.”3 
Nevertheless, business professionals value these almost-binding agree-
ments. When two companies sign an LOI, the parties often view it as a 
reason to celebrate. An LOI is considered a major milestone in the lifecycle 
of many transactions.4 
Lawyers, however, are less enthusiastic. One prominent corporate lawyer 
went so far as to describe LOIs as “an invention of the devil [that] should be 
avoided at all costs.”5 Case law provides numerous examples of the potential 
legal pitfalls of using LOIs. In Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., one of the most 
prominent cases involving LOIs, the court held a supposed LOI to be a 
binding contract, which ultimately cost Texaco $8.5 billion.6 Although such 
a large recovery is rare, the legal conclusion is not. Courts frequently find 
LOIs to be binding contracts,7 but just as often find similar LOIs to be 
 
1 Judith Silver, The Letter of Intent: Why Business People Love ’Em and Lawyers Hate ’Em, 
COOLLAWYER, https://www.coollawyer.com/webfront/internet_law_library/articles/law_library_letter_ 
of_intent_article.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
2 Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts 
Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 282 (2004). 
3 Silver, supra note 1. 
4 See Gregory G. Gosfield, The Structure and Use of Letters of Intent as Prenegotiation Contracts 
for Prospective Real Estate Transactions, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 99, 100 (2003) (describing 
the importance of LOIs in the real estate context). 
5 Andrew R. Klein, Comment, Devil’s Advocate: Salvaging the Letter of Intent, 37 EMORY L.J. 
139, 139 n.1 (1988) (quoting Stephen R. Volk, a former senior partner of Shearman & Sterling 
LLP, New York, New York). 
6 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987). 
7 See, e.g., S. Colo. MRI, Ltd. v. Med-Alliance, Inc., 166 F.3d 1094, 1099 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(finding an LOI binding based on the conclusion that the parties waived the requirement of a final 
writing by their actions); Hoxeng v. Topeka Broadcomm, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1323, 1331 (D. Kan. 
1996) (finding an LOI binding because the parties’ actions reflected an intent to be bound); 
Krauth v. Exec. Telecard, Ltd., 890 F. Supp. 269, 293-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding an LOI binding 
based on a multifactor analysis).  
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unenforceable.8 In the words of the late E. Allan Farnsworth, “It would be 
difficult to find a less predictable area of contract law.”9  
If parties cannot predict the legal effect of LOIs, why are they used so 
frequently? Many explanations have been proposed, yet none adequately 
addresses the element of legal unpredictability that inheres in LOIs. In fact, 
the leading explanations do not identify a meaningful relationship between 
LOIs and contract law. This Comment identifies how legal unpredictability 
affects the operation of LOIs as a negotiating tool and ultimately concludes 
that LOIs manipulate legal unpredictability to the parties’ mutual advantage. 
Specifically, this Comment argues that signing an LOI facilitates an eco-
nomic hostage exchange that aligns counterparties’ incentives, decreases 
both parties’ abilities to act strategically, and makes completion of the 
transaction more likely.  
Part I provides an overview of how LOIs are viewed from business and 
legal perspectives, highlighting the difficulty that courts have encountered 
when interpreting LOIs within the framework of traditional contract 
doctrine. Part II considers the most common justifications for why LOIs are 
used despite their legal uncertainty and explains why these justifications are 
incomplete. Part III compares LOIs with other forms of nonbinding 
agreements, noting the differences between each and concluding that the 
unique attributes of LOIs call for a unique explanation of how they operate. 
Part IV presents the principal thesis that LOIs are useful precisely because 
of their legal uncertainty. To further this thesis, it demonstrates how parties 
executing LOIs strategically manipulate uncertainty in the American legal 
system to create a form of economic hostage exchange. Finally, Part IV 
provides an overview of the hostage-exchange theory and applies it to LOIs.  
 
8 See, e.g., Rennick v. O.P.T.I.O.N. Care, Inc., 77 F.3d 309, 316 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding an 
LOI nonbinding despite later actions intended to finalize the deal); Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co 
Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding an LOI nonbinding based on specific 
language in the agreement); JamSports & Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 
824, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding an LOI nonbinding as to certain terms because it was condi-
tioned on a final agreement); Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615, 620-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(finding an LOI nonbinding based on the conditional language of the writing); Cabot Corp. v. 
AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 513 (Mass. 2007) (finding an LOI nonbinding despite certain terms 
the parties intended to be binding). 
9 E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and 
Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 259-60 (1987) (“In doubtful cases, courts have looked 
to many factors, but no single factor is likely to be decisive. Often the final decision is left to the 
trier of the facts.” (footnote omitted)). 
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I. LOIS FROM BUSINESS AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
A. LOIs from a Business Perspective 
Business professionals use LOIs in a wide variety of settings. Most 
commonly, LOIs are used in “transactions involving the sale of goods and 
services, financing transactions, and real estate transactions.”10 They are also 
common in M&A transactions.11 Regardless of the business transaction they 
are used in, all LOIs reflect the parties’ preliminary agreements or under-
standings with respect to a future contract. Therefore, they are by definition 
precontractual rather than contractual.12 As such, they are not intended to 
be fully binding.13 This is true even when, as is often the case, an LOI contains 
certain terms that the parties intend to be binding; when it resembles a 
lengthy, complex contract in every respect; and when both parties sign it.14 
Although the use of LOIs is widespread, there is no consensus among 
business professionals as to why they are useful. Rather, corporate execu-
tives give a multitude of nonspecific justifications for their use. 15  For 
example, an LOI has been said to serve as “a mere gesture showing interest 
in the possibility of a transaction” or it may be “an orderly collection of the 
necessary contractual terms ready to be binding, but missing the key 
ingredient—the intent to be bound.” 16  Others believe LOIs “set[] the 
binding ground rules of a negotiation,” or, more generally, “provide some 
context to the interest of the parties” in a vague, nonbinding fashion.17  
Business professionals value vagueness as a positive attribute of LOIs, and 
ambiguity18 is often intended.19 It has been suggested that LOIs’ ambiguity 
helps negotiating parties avoid “direct confrontation and deadlock,” and that 
 
10 RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECON-
TRACTUAL DOCUMENTS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMS 3 (2d ed. 1994). 
11 Id. See generally DONALD M. DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER 
RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES 177 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining the role of LOIs in the typical 
M&A process). 
12 LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 5-6 (“A letter of intent may be defined as a precon-
tractual written instrument that reflects preliminary agreements or understandings of one or more 
parties to a future contract.”). 
13 Id. at 7-8 (noting that case law supports the proposition that LOIs are nonobligatory).  
14 Id. at 9.  
15 See Gosfield, supra note 4, at 106. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 100. 
18 Despite the formal distinction between ambiguity and vagueness, this Comment uses the 
terms interchangeably to connote a lack of clarity that is generally expected in a final, binding 
contract. 
19 See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 11 (noting that “ambiguity and obscurity may not 
be entirely unintentional”). 
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parties often “present nonbinding terms ambiguously with the expectation 
that the ambiguity will be resolved when the terms become binding.”20 
While LOIs are characterized by a lack of clarity, one point is clear: 
LOIs do something—whether easily identified or not—to move parties closer 
to a final agreement. The frequency of their use and the sophistication of the 
parties that use them provide the best evidence of this conclusion.21  
B. LOIs from a Legal Perspective 
1. Lawyers’ Perceptions of LOIs 
Lawyers generally dislike LOIs. LOIs’ contractual form coupled with 
their intentionally nonbinding quality place them in an “unclear gray zone” 
of contract law.22 While business professionals might view this coupling as a 
positive characteristic, contract lawyers view the coupling as inherently 
contradictory. Further, lawyers tend to equate ambiguity and uncertainty 
with poor lawyering because these characteristics invite litigation23 as well 
as strategic behavior from counterparties.24 The ultimate legal effects of 
LOIs have been described as possibly “ruinous.”25 If litigated, courts often 
ignore the business context in which LOIs were executed and analyze them 
“as typical contracts, focusing on the sufficiency of their terms and on the 
parties’ ‘intent.’”26 Courts must use traditional contract doctrine to deter-
mine the intent of the parties manifested in an LOI. This creates anxiety 
 
20 Gosfield, supra note 4, at 101. It has not, however, been explained how this resolution of 
the ambiguity eventually occurs. 
21 See Thomas C. Homburger & James R. Schueller, Letters of Intent—A Trap for the Unwary, 
37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509, 511 (2002) (noting that sophisticated transactions frequently 
involve the use of LOIs).  
22 LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 10-11. 
23 See Gosfield, supra note 4, at 101 (“Sometimes binding terms are ambiguous, which adds 
the risk that a third-party finder of fact will be needed to construe the proper meaning or impose a 
new one.”). 
24 See id. (“Those who condemn letters of intent for their unpredictability fear the exploita-
tion of that ambiguity as the ulterior strategy of the adverse party.”); see also LAKE & DRAETTA, 
supra note 10, at 11 (“The examination of a number of letters of intent has shown that behind a 
stated common intention often lie divergent, unrevealed intentions.”). 
25 See Gosfield, supra note 4, at 101 (“The possible ruinous effects of letters of intent should 
be to no one’s surprise. Even when composed under a more temperate humor, a letter of intent can 
promote confusion because it is necessarily incomplete as to the anticipated transaction. This 
incompleteness implicitly fosters ambiguity.”). 
26 Klein, supra note 5, at 142. 
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for lawyers and challenges for courts because LOIs do not fit neatly within 
the bounds of standard contract law.27 
2. LOIs and Traditional Contract Doctrine 
When confronted with a dispute over an ambiguous LOI, traditional 
contract doctrine provides courts with the basic ground rules for discerning 
the intent of the parties. That doctrine, however, contains little practical 
guidance for completing the task. In an attempt to accommodate the 
realities of modern commerce, shifts in contract doctrine during the twentieth 
century urged courts to find a binding contract—even when a writing lacked 
the standard formalities or important terms often included in contracts—if 
the court concluded from the objective manifestations of the parties that 
they intended to form a binding contract.28 To further this goal, factfinders 
have been given a variety of gap-filling tools to assist them if they find a 
binding contract that lacks certain essential terms.29 While this develop-
ment has proven beneficial in many contexts, it has also increased the 
chance that a court will find a binding contract when the parties did not 
intend one. This risk is compounded in the case of LOIs, where terms 
intended to be binding are often placed side-by-side with terms not intended 
to bind the parties. The relevant provisions of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts (Restatement) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
illustrate the problem.  
Sections 33 and 34 of the Restatement are most relevant to a factfinder 
confronted with an ambiguous LOI. Section 33(3), entitled “Certainty,” 
cautions that “[t]he fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are 
left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not 
 
27 See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 18 (“In both common law and civil law countries 
the use of letters of intent has outpaced the development of their jurisprudence. This is due in 
part to the fact that letters of intent do not insert themselves in a sufficiently articulated legal 
context in any of the common or civil law systems.”). 
28 See generally 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 3:5 (4th ed. 1990) (describing the development of contract doctrine during the 
twentieth century). 
29 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979) (“Supplying an 
Omitted Essential Term. When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have 
not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a 
term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”); see also U.C.C. § 2-204(3) 
(2011) (“Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
basis for an appropriate remedy.”); id. § 2-305 (“Open Price Term”); id. § 2-308 (“Absence of 
Specified Place for Delivery”); id. § 2-309 (“Absence of Specific Time Provisions”); id. § 2-310 
(“Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit”). 
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intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.”30 The first 
official comment to that same provision, however, recognizes that “the 
actions of the parties may show conclusively that they have intended to 
conclude a binding agreement, even though one or more terms are missing 
or are left to be agreed upon.”31 In such an instance, the court is called upon 
“to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain.”32 Similarly, the 
official comment to section 34 of the Restatement states that “[a] bargain 
may be concluded which leaves a choice of terms to be made by one party or 
the other.”33 Assuming a state’s law mirrors the Restatement, how should a 
factfinder determine whether an LOI is binding or not when it lacks 
essential terms?  
Further complicating matters are the Restatement’s “Rules in Aid of 
Interpretation” in section 202, which instruct that a writing must be “inter-
preted as a whole,”34 and that “the manifestations of intention of the 
parties” must be “interpreted as consistent with each other” whenever 
reasonable.35 But how does a judge or jury interpret an LOI “as a whole” 
when it contains both binding and nonbinding terms?  
The UCC also asks courts to divine the true meaning of an unclear LOI 
involving the sale of goods. UCC section 2-204(3), “Formation in General,” 
reflects the UCC’s general preference for finding a binding contract in 
questionable situations. It provides that “[e]ven though one or more terms 
are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for 
giving an appropriate remedy.”36 To aid in filling any gaps, the UCC 
contains specific provisions relating to open price, 37  time, 38  and other 
essential terms.39 Prior versions of the UCC also provided factfinders with 
various evidentiary guides to aid them in their task,40 but these provisions 
offered little practical assistance absent a preexisting relationship between 
 
30 RESTATEMENT § 33(3) (emphasis added). 
31 Id. § 33 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
32 Id. (“An offer which appears to be indefinite may be given precision by usage of trade or by 
course of dealing between the parties. Terms may be supplied by factual implication, and in 
recurring situations the law often supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the contrary.”). 
33 Id. § 34 cmt. a. 
34 Id. § 202(2). 
35 Id. § 202(5). 
36 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2011). 
37 See id. § 2-305 (“Open Price Term”).  
38 See id. § 2-309 (“Absence of Specific Time Provisions”). 
39 See, e.g., id. § 2-308 (“Absence of Specified Place for Delivery”); id. § 2-310 (“Open Time 
for Payment or Running of Credit”). 
40 See, e.g., § 1-205 (2002) (“Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade”); id. § 2-208 (“Course of 
Performance or Practical Construction”). 
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the parties or well-defined customs in the relevant trade or business.41 If the 
parties were otherwise unrelated and had just begun negotiations, the UCC’s 
evidentiary guides were of little help. 
The ultimate result under traditional contract doctrine is that a judge or 
jury interpreting an LOI could be justified in finding any or all of its terms 
binding or nonbinding. Thus, it appears that parties signing an LOI are 
assenting to a legal gamble. 
3. Courts Have Struggled to Interpret LOIs 
A study of relevant case law shows that courts have failed to resolve the 
tension between LOIs and traditional contract doctrine. Several major cases 
typify the courts’ “multifactor” approach to the problem posed by LOIs—all 
of which effectively reduce to a general consideration of all the circumstances. 
In short, courts have not developed a solution to the conundrum illustrated 
by the relevant Restatement and UCC provisions.  
For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., Pennzoil executed an LOI 
with Getty Oil regarding a merger.42 The LOI stated that the parties’ 
obligations would become binding only after execution of a final merger 
agreement.43 The parties issued press releases describing the terms of the 
deal, while stating that they had only executed an “agreement in princi-
ple.”44 Before a final merger agreement was signed, Getty began negotia-
tions with Texaco, 45  and Texaco ultimately made a higher bid than 
Pennzoil.46 The Getty board quickly approved Texaco’s offer.47 Pennzoil 
then sued Texaco for tortious interference of contract, asserting that Penn-
zoil’s LOI with Getty was in fact a binding contract.48 
The court, applying New York law,49 considered several factors to determine 
 
41 See id. 
42 729 S.W.2d 768, 785 (Tex. App. 1987). 
43 Id. at 789. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 786. 
46 Id. at 787. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 784. 
49 It is particularly appropriate to consider LOIs interpreted under New York law because 
parties often choose New York contract law due to its relative predictability and the primacy it 
places on the plain meaning of the writing. See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N., FINAL REPORT OF 
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON NEW YORK LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL MATTERS 2 (2011), available at http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset. 
aspx?id=34027 (discussing why commercial parties often select New York law to govern transac-
tions). Thus, one may presume that New York law would be relatively accommodating to carefully 
drafted LOIs. 
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whether Pennzoil and Getty intended to be bound by the LOI. These 
factors included 
(1) whether a party expressly reserved the right to be bound only when a 
written agreement is signed; (2) whether there was any partial performance 
by one party that the party disclaiming the contract accepted; (3) whether 
all essential terms of the alleged contract had been agreed upon; and (4) 
whether the complexity or magnitude of the transaction was such that a 
formal, executed writing would normally be expected.50  
At first blush, it appears that the LOI in question would not constitute a 
binding contract under these factors. The parties stated in the LOI that 
they would not be bound by the terms until a final merger agreement was 
executed,51 there was no partial performance, and the magnitude of the 
transaction—amounting to billions of dollars—would surely be expected to 
require a formal, executed writing before it could be finalized. And although 
the parties had agreed on the most essential terms—the transactional 
structure and price—they had not agreed on many other critical terms, such 
as the merger’s impact on employees52 and how to identify a party that 
would purchase a significant number of outstanding Getty shares.53 
Nevertheless, a Texas jury determined that Pennzoil and Getty had entered 
into a binding agreement and awarded Pennzoil $10.53 billion for Texaco’s 
tortious interference of contract.54 The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld 
the verdict, although it ultimately reduced the damages awarded.55 Despite 
many indications of a lack of intent to be immediately bound by the LOI, 
the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was sufficient evidence for a jury 
to conclude that a binding contract had been formed.56 Even though the 
multifactor approach should have guided the analysis, the court stated that 
the intent of the parties must still be determined by the objective theory of 
contract57 and that when the LOI is ambiguous, the factfinder must consider 
all evidence—including all written and oral statements made by anyone 
 
50 Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 788-89. 
51 Id. at 789. 
52 Id. at 794. 
53 Id. at 792. 
54 See id. at 784 (granting Pennzoil $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in 
punitive damages). 
55 See id. at 866 (reducing the damages awarded to Pennzoil by $2 billion). 
56 Id. at 789-95 (holding that “[t]he record as a whole demonstrates that there was legally and 
factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding . . . that the [parties] intended to bind 
themselves to an agreement”). 
57 Id. at 789 (“The issue of when the parties intended to be bound is a fact question to be 
decided from the parties’ acts and communications.”). 
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involved in the negotiations—in order to ascertain whether or not a binding 
contract had been formed. 58  The decision demonstrates how little the 
factfinder is constrained or guided by the multifactor approach.  
A federal court reached a similar conclusion in Teachers Insurance & Annuity 
Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co., where a dispute arose over an LOI that had 
been executed in the course of negotiations over a potential loan.59 After 
signing the LOI, Tribune, the potential borrower, refused to continue 
negotiations with Teachers, the potential lender.60 Tribune claimed that it 
ceased negotiations because Teachers refused to accept a critical accounting 
term related to the transaction.61 Teachers, on the other hand, claimed that 
Tribune had walked away because interest rates had dropped and it sought a 
better deal from a different lender.62  
The court recognized that multiple factors had to be considered in order 
to determine whether the parties intended to be bound by the LOI. These 
factors include (1) the language of the agreement; (2) the context of the 
negotiations; (3) the existence of open terms; (4) partial performance; and 
(5) the necessity of putting the agreement in final form.63 After being 
presented with large amounts of conflicting evidence on all of these points, 
the Tribune court carefully considered each factor.64 Ultimately, the court 
rejected as inadequate all of the evidence supporting Tribune’s arguments, 
holding that the LOI was binding.65  
In the same fashion as the Texaco decision, Tribune demonstrates how the 
multifactor test collapses into a consideration of all the circumstances, with 
the judge or jury free to find any factor or factors dispositive. In Tribune, it 
is implicitly clear that the court’s perception of the second factor—the 
context of negotiations—swallowed the other factors. And although Teachers 
could not directly prove that Tribune had ceased negotiations merely 
because interest rates had dropped, a reader of the Tribune decision will find it 
difficult to ignore the possibility that the court was convinced by Teachers’ 
 
58 Id. at 796 (stating that when intent cannot be wholly determined by a written agreement, 
“extrinsic evidence of relevant events is properly considered on the question of that intent”). 
59 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
60 Id. at 496. 
61 Id. at 491. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 499-503; see also Norris D. Wolff, Letters of Intent, Preliminary Agreements, and Binding 
Acquisition Agreements, 111 BANKING L.J. 292, 292-93 & n.1 (1994) (noting that Tribune’s multifactor 
test has been frequently cited in subsequent LOI cases in New York). 
64 Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 499-503.  
65 Id. at 499 (concluding that the LOI in question “represented a binding preliminary com-
mitment and obligated both sides to seek to conclude a final loan agreement”). 
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unproven contention and used the flexible multifactor test merely as a 
means to achieve a desired result. 
Another similar outcome arose in Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.66 
The parties had begun negotiations for Newport to build a warehouse for 
Sears.67 They executed an LOI stating their intent “to enter into the 
transaction on substantially the . . . terms and conditions” contained in 
the LOI, although the LOI was not a “comprehensive statement of [the 
parties’] rights, duties and obligations.”68 Sears later determined that it 
needed to downsize the project, and Newport sued Sears for breach of the 
contract supposedly formed when the LOI was signed.69 The court, citing 
Texaco and other cases, concluded that the LOI was ambiguous as to whether 
the parties intended it to be binding, and therefore that consideration of all 
the surrounding circumstances was required.70 Presented with conflicting 
evidence, the jury had considerable latitude to decide either way, but 
ultimately concluded that the LOI was binding and that Newport was 
entitled to damages.71 
While the court recognized that the evidence supporting Newport’s 
damages claim was “admittedly thin,” it confirmed that a jury could award 
Newport compensation for such categories of damages as “out-of-pocket 
costs, lost public monies, and lost profits” if the jury believed an expert 
witness’s testimony regarding the certainty of those values.72 A unanimous 
jury awarded total damages of almost $13 million, $10.6 million of which 
reflected lost profits.73  
Ultimately, these cases illustrate three important points regarding the 
courts’ struggles with LOIs. First, multifactor tests have failed to provide 
the structured analysis that they may initially appear to provide. Because 
LOIs are inherently ambiguous, the analyses inevitably break down into a 
general consideration of all the facts. The tests provide no guidance for 
weighing competing factors; therefore, the outcome in disputes over LOIs can 
easily turn on details that would appear arbitrary to many negotiating parties.  
 
66 6 F.3d 1058, 1070 (5th Cir. 1993). 
67 Id. at 1060. 
68 Id. at 1066 (alterations in original). 
69 Id. at 1063-64. 
70 Id. at 1065-66. 
71 Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 86-2319, 1995 WL 626188, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 
24, 1995) (noting that “a unanimous jury returned a verdict of $10,668,000.00 in lost profits and 
$1,900,000 for out of pocket expenses to Newport”). 
72 Sears, 6 F.3d at 1069-70. 
73 Newport, 1995 WL 626188, at *1. 
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The second important point these cases illustrate is that the courts’ 
approach to LOIs tends to yield all-or-nothing results.74 This reflects the 
problem with section 202 of the Restatement, which requires terms to be 
construed as “consistent with each other” whenever reasonable.75 While this 
requirement could mean many things, the plainest meaning—and the 
meaning that has been borne out by court decisions—is that all of the terms 
of an LOI will be construed as wholly binding or wholly nonbinding. This 
approach means that litigation over an LOI will likely generate a windfall for 
one party or the other.76 Courts cannot easily parse an LOI and distinguish 
binding terms from nonbinding terms. Even if the parties use clear language, 
there is always the possibility that the court will find very specific consider-
ations dispositive and rule contrary to the parties’ intentions. 
Third, damages awards, if awarded by the court, are extremely difficult 
to predict in LOI cases because the range of possible awards is wide. As in 
Texaco and Sears, courts may be willing to compensate parties for a variety 
of damages categories, such as lost profits, provided that an expert witness 
can convince the factfinder that a certain loss is attributable to breach of the 
agreement. This wide range makes damages awards exceptionally difficult 
for litigating parties to predict ex ante and injects considerable legal uncer-
tainty into negotiations in which LOIs are used. 
The tension between LOIs and standard contract doctrine, as well as the 
courts’ struggles to interpret LOIs, has been identified in numerous other 
analyses.77  Yet at this point in other analyses, commentators generally 
proceed to either (1) provide reasons why courts should respect the “intent” 
of the parties and find LOI terms binding only when the parties so intend 
 
74 See Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the “Fat Lady” Sing?: An Analysis of “Agreements in Principle” 
in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 130 (1986) (“Through using the ‘all or 
nothing’ approach, courts, for the most part, have not considered the ‘agreement in principle’ cases 
as a separate category. Thus, the commercial expectations of the parties at the middle ‘agreement 
in principle’ stage are often ignored, creating an inequitable and an inefficient situation.”). 
75 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
76 The all-or-nothing results observed in the case law can also be explained by the traditional 
notions of mutual assent and the duty of good faith and fair dealing. According to the traditional 
notion of contract formation, a binding agreement is formed at the instant of mutual assent. 
Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman’s Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern 
Practice: United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 93 (Supp. 1998). It thus becomes tempting for a 
court to find all terms in an LOI binding when it concludes that at least some terms are binding. 
The classic notion of mutual assent struggles to accommodate piecemeal agreements. Id. Further, 
the fact that many LOIs contain obligations to negotiate in good faith makes it more likely that a 
court will find multiple terms in an LOI binding because, at common law, the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing does not exist until an otherwise enforceable contract is formed. Id. at 93-94. 
77 See, e.g., Temkin, supra note 74, at 131-35 (discussing the inherent tensions between standard 
contract doctrine and LOIs); Klein, supra note 5, at 144-48 (highlighting the inconsistent case law 
regarding LOIs). 
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(without suggesting how this intention may be ascertained given the 
restrictions of existing contract doctrine) or (2) explain nonlegal ways that 
LOIs nevertheless induce compliance with their terms.78 These nonlegal 
explanations are summarized in Part II, which also identifies why other 
commentators’ explanations are insufficient.  
II. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF LOIS  
DESPITE THEIR LEGAL UNCERTAINTY  
Given the legal uncertainty that accompanies LOIs, why are they used at 
all? How can LOIs be useful if parties cannot predict how courts will 
enforce them? Many explanations have been proposed to answer these 
questions, and while each explanation helps to identify certain attributes of 
LOIs that make them useful under certain conditions, none have identified 
a link between LOIs and the American legal system. This is troublesome 
because LOIs are inherently legal documents and often contain terms that 
the parties intend to be legally enforceable. The most common theoretical 
justifications for the use of LOIs are considered below, as are reasons why 
each justification does not sufficiently explain why LOIs remain effective 
negotiating tools despite their legal uncertainty. 
A. Reputational Consequences of Noncompliance 
Perhaps the most common justification for the efficacy of LOIs is that 
business professionals fear the reputational consequences of noncompli-
ance.79 Under this theory, reputational consequences operate in lieu of the 
legal system either to induce compliance or administer punishment for 
breach. Legal uncertainty is unimportant because the theory does not 
contemplate a need to resort to the legal system. Rather, under appropriate 
conditions, agreements enforced through reputational consequences are 
essentially self-enforcing. 
But there are fundamental problems with this “reputational consequences” 
rationale in the LOI context. For the reputational element to have an 
appreciable effect, the parties must be members of a reasonably small 
 
78 See, e.g., Temkin, supra note 74, at 127 (concluding “that courts have not focused on the 
probable expectation of the parties in determining whether a binding and enforceable contract has 
arisen at the ‘agreement in principle’ stage,” and then proposing a new way for courts to categorize 
LOIs); Klein, supra note 5, at 169 (arguing that “[l]etters of intent should not be interpreted as 
binding merger contracts”). 
79 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice 
Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113, 118-19 (2003) (“Letters of intent, which are common, depend for 
their efficacy on reputation and good faith, not enforcement.”). 
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community, ideally one with “long-term bonds of trust between the market 
participants.”80  A good example of such a community is the diamond 
industry, which uses a combination of “reputational bonds, customary 
business practices, and arbitration proceedings” to enforce agreements and 
sanction noncompliance.81 The necessary small size and long-term bonds are 
not present in a vast majority of the industries or transactions in which 
LOIs are used. In most instances, there are simply too many market partici-
pants for the “reputational consequences” rationale to fully explain how LOIs 
work. In many cases, the parties are not even members of the same market.  
Additionally, the reputational element requires publicity of both the 
LOI and the final outcome.82 If either of these is confidential, the reputa-
tional device cannot operate.83 Thus, the reputational rationale is unavailable 
if, as is often the case, an LOI is signed alongside a confidentiality agree-
ment.84 The reputational rationale, therefore, cannot fully explain why LOIs 
are used despite their legal uncertainty. 
B. Strength of Moral Obligations 
Another common explanation for why LOIs are effective is that business 
professionals who sign them feel a moral obligation to comply with their 
terms, and this moral obligation is sufficient to deter noncompliance.85 It 
has been suggested that “reasonably principled businessmen” view LOIs as a 
moral obligation that should be taken “quite seriously.”86 
However, the morality rationale is problematic in the LOI context for 
several reasons. Most importantly, it is not clear whose morals promote 
compliance. LOIs are usually executed between corporate entities, not 
individuals, and they are used in negotiations that involve many individuals 
 
80 Bernstein & Zekoll, supra note 76, at 108 (describing long-term bonds of trust as “a necessary 
condition for the smooth and efficient operation of business” that relies on reputational effects to 
support exchange). 
81 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 157 (1992). 
82 Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 288 (1956) (“Both 
the initial offer and the final outcome would have to be known; and if secrecy surrounds either 
point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device is unavailable.”). 
83 Id. 
84 See Silver, supra note 1 (“An LOI typically comes into play after a round of initial discus-
sions and after the signing of a Confidentiality Agreement . . . .”). 
85 See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL ON USING LETTERS OF INTENT IN 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1:2 (2013) (“[C]lients may . . . want a letter of intent to put moral 
pressure on a reluctant party when it comes time to finalize the deal or perform on the contract. 
Having ‘agreed’ to a deal, that party may feel obligated to continue negotiations.”). 
86 Klein, supra note 5, at 142 (quoting JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 60 (1975)). 
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with very different roles.87 For the morality rationale to function, one must 
first answer the question: Whose morals control the final decision to comply 
or not? The bankers’, the attorneys’, the consultants’, the Board of Directors’, 
or the negotiating employees’? In the most pristine model of corporate 
decisionmaking, ultimate authority resides in the CEO. But in reality, 
corporate decisionmaking processes are far more complex, with many 
participants influencing outcomes.88 If complying with an LOI becomes 
adverse to a corporation’s interests, it is unlikely that such a collection of 
individuals would feel bound by a collective moral compass.  
Further, there is tension between the morality rationale and the fact that 
LOIs contain so many legal formalities. It is not clear why a seemingly legal 
document would be necessary to communicate a moral commitment. If all 
that the parties wish to do is express a moral commitment, there are far 
simpler ways of doing so that do not include signing a formal document. 
Thus, the morality rationale is insufficient because it ignores the realities of 
corporate decisionmaking as well as the inherently legal nature of LOIs. 
C. Simplifying Complex Negotiations 
Some scholars have argued that LOIs serve as a tool for simplifying and 
organizing the terms of complex negotiations. Under this justification, the 
LOI serves merely as a reminder of terms that have already been agreed 
upon.89 The need for such a reminder supposedly arises from the many tax 
and regulatory aspects of modern business transactions, which “can tax the 
memory of any negotiator.”90  
The simplification rationale suffers from two primary flaws. First, it 
ignores the fact that there are many other ways to record settled terms 
without signing a legal document. A summary of agreed-upon terms need 
not be signed to serve its purpose. This explanation does little more than 
recognize that writing terms down aids the parties’ memories. Second, this 
explanation ignores the fact that LOIs also introduce new forms of complexity 
to negotiations, such as the possibility of litigation and uncertain enforce-
ment of random terms. It is not clear why parties would summarize terms 
 
87 See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at xxi (explaining that oftentimes “the participation 
of third parties, such as financial institutions, governmental officials, subcontractors, and 
consultants in the negotiation is essential”). 
88 See Paul Shrivastava & John H. Grant, Empirically Derived Models of Strategic Decision-
making Processes, 6 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 97, 98 (1985) (noting that corporate “[d]ecision making 
occurs in sequential phases, at multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy”). 
89 See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 15 (suggesting that “[l]etters of intent are often 
used as frameworks for future negotiations”).  
90 Id. at 16. 
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through an LOI rather than through an alternative form that does not carry 
similar legal risks.91  
D. Securities Laws and Financing 
Although not a justification for the efficacy of LOIs, it should also be 
noted that LOIs may be relevant in the context of federal securities laws 
and financing agreements. Specifically, signing an LOI may trigger certain 
responsibilities of directors and officers under Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5,92 even though an LOI is not required under 
the SEC’s regulations. Additionally, LOIs may be shown to a party’s 
potential financing sources as evidence of a viable deal,93 although this is not 
always done. Therefore, LOIs remain an optional device whose utility 
cannot be fully explained by their relevance to securities laws or financing 
agreements. 
Ultimately, none of these justifications fully explains the relationship be-
tween LOIs and the American legal system. A comparison of LOIs with other 
nonbinding agreements demonstrates why such an explanation is necessary. 
III. COMPARISON WITH OTHER NONBINDING AGREEMENTS 
Various types of agreements do not rely on the coercive power of the 
state for their enforcement. Instead, they rely on alternative mechanisms to 
induce compliance and punish noncompliance. These agreements will be 
collectively referred to as “nonbinding” or “self-enforcing” agreements. 
Traditionally, several mechanisms have been used in lieu of the legal system 
to enforce nonbinding agreements, most notably (1) reputational conse-
quences, (2) private arbitration, (3) physical or economic retaliation, and (4) 
collateral, or hostage, exchanges.94  
While many factors may lead parties to enter a nonbinding agreement, 
parties are most likely to do so by necessity when there is no legal regime 
that can enforce their agreement. Treaties between nations are perhaps the 
 
91 For example, the parties could exchange unsigned drafts of the agreement and mark up 
each version received before sending it back to the other party. This process would similarly clarify 
those terms over which there is apparent agreement and those over which there is not agreement. 
92 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232-41 (1988) (considering when merger discussions 
and agreements-in-principal may rise to the level of a “material” event for purposes of SEC Rule 
10b-5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
93 See DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 11, at 177. 
94 See Katharina Pistor, Supply and Demand for Contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Arbitration, 
and Private Enforcement, 22 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 55, 66-67 (1996) (describing enforcement 
mechanisms that may serve as an alternative to a formal legal system). 
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most visible, studied, and well-understood form of nonbinding agreements. 
Treaties have traditionally relied on reputational consequences and the 
potential for physical or economic retaliation to induce compliance with 
their terms. 95  Reputational consequences are an effective enforcement 
mechanism for treaties because the global community of nations is small—
totaling approximately 195 nations.96 Further, nations are almost necessarily 
repeat players in their interactions with one another, and they depend on 
one another in a multitude of ways.97 These conditions make reputational 
consequences a particularly potent enforcement mechanism for agreements 
between nations. And because treaties are almost always highly publicized, 
there is little impediment to the reputational effect functioning properly. 
Another interesting example of nonbinding agreements is private con-
tracts formed under weak legal regimes that do not have the capability or 
resources to enforce them. Private contracts that were formed in post-Soviet 
Russia during the late 1990s serve as a prime example.98 Several studies 
demonstrate that during this period, when the Russian government was not 
strong enough to enforce contracts, parties resorted to the use of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms. These included reputational mechanisms at 
times, but were primarily more coercive in nature. The use of criminal 
groups and private protection companies to provide physical retaliation for 
noncompliance was particularly prevalent, as was the use of hostage or 
collateral exchanges.99  
LOIs belong to the family of nonbinding agreements because, by defini-
tion, they include certain terms that the parties do not expect to be enforced 
through a legal system,100 yet the parties still expect one another to comply 
with those terms. Therefore, the parties must rely on some other mechanism 
 
95 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 203-04 
(1993) (providing various justifications for why nations comply with treaties).  
96 Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.state.gov/s/inr/ 
rls/4250.htm. 
97 See generally Jana von Stein, Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Com-
pliance, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 (2005) (providing an extensive analysis of reputation as a 
compliance mechanism for treaties and describing the nature of continued interaction between 
nations with respect to treaties). 
98 See Pistor, supra note 94, at 62-63 (“[I]n the former socialist countries, particularly in Rus-
sia[,] . . . [there was] neither an effective court system nor a well-developed system of private 
dispute resolution mechanisms.”). 
99 See id. at 66-67 (describing the various contract enforcement mechanisms used in Russia 
during the 1990s); see also Vadim Volkov, Security and Rule-Enforcement in Russian Business: The Role 
of the “Mafia” and the State 1 (European Univ. at St. Petersburg, PONARS Policy Memo No. 79, 
1999) (“In the mid-1990s up to 70% of all contracts were enforced without any participation from 
state organs.”). 
100 See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 10, at 7-9. 
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to induce compliance, as other nonbinding agreements do. However, LOIs 
are unique compared to other nonbinding agreements because the parties to 
an LOI consciously attempt to opt out of the legal system. This difference 
calls for a closer examination of the relationship between LOIs and the 
American legal system.  
Whereas prior analyses seem to simply extend explanations of treaties to 
LOIs (thus focusing primarily on “soft” enforcement mechanisms, such as 
the reputational rationale), Part IV seeks to expand the understanding of 
why parties adhere to “nonbinding” LOI terms. It does so by considering 
one of the less frequently studied, more coercive enforcement mechanisms 
observed in more primitive forms of nonbinding agreements: the hostage 
exchange.  
IV. LOIS AS A FORM OF HOSTAGE EXCHANGE 
Viewing LOIs as a form of economic hostage exchange provides an 
explanation of how LOIs interact with the American legal system. Specifi-
cally, the hostage theory demonstrates how LOIs manipulate uncertainty 
within that system to increase their utility as a bargaining tool. To under-
stand how this manipulation functions, one must first consider the modern 
theory of economic hostage exchanges.  
A. The Hostage Theory 
Other than physical retaliation for nonperformance, hostage exchanges 
are perhaps the most primitive contract enforcement mechanism.101 In its 
most basic form, a hostage exchange arises when the parties’ agreement 
involves a desired performance to take place at some point in the future. To 
mitigate the risk of contingencies that may arise between the time of 
agreement and the time of performance, the promisor gives the promisee a 
hostage, which increases the likelihood that the promisor’s performance will 
occur.102 The “hostage” can be anything (or anyone) of value to the promi-
sor.103 The promisor knows that the promisee can destroy the hostage if the 
promisor does not perform, which incentivizes the promisor to keep his end 
of the bargain; in turn, the promisee is made more secure.104 The promisee 
need not resort to the legal system to enforce the agreement because he 
 
101 See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 
12-15 (1985) (describing the traditional hostage-exchange model). 
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possesses both a coercive means for inducing compliance and a means for 
punishing noncompliance. By providing a hostage, the promisor’s commit-
ment becomes more credible. 
In 1983, Oliver Williamson first elaborated the theory that hostage ex-
changes are used in modern commerce to create credible commitments.105 
According to Williamson, credible commitments are made when parties 
perform reciprocal acts designed to “safeguard a relationship.”106 He posited 
that economic hostage exchanges are a form of reciprocal act, the use of 
which “is widespread and economically important,” despite the fact that 
hostage exchanges are often viewed as “a quaint concept with little or no 
practical importance to contemporary contracting.” 107  Furthermore, he 
explained that this perception has arisen from the “convenient,” but false, 
assumption that “the legal system [always] enforces promises in a knowledge-
able, sophisticated, and low-cost way.” 108  Ignored by “legal centralists,” 
“additional or alternative modes of governance have arisen” in response to 
inefficiencies in the legal system, and modern commerce is replete with 
“bilateral efforts to create and offer hostages.”109  
The effect of the hostage exchange is to “protect contracts against ex-
propriation” by expanding a contractual relationship through the creation of 
a “mutual reliance relation.” 110  The parties create a state of reciprocal 
exposure by “credibly ‘tieing [their] hands.’” 111  Each party does so by 
providing the other with a means of extracting value in the event of non-
compliance. Despite traditional notions of the hostage-exchange scenario, 
Williamson explained that modern economic hostage exchanges do not 
occur because a stronger party demands something of the weaker party; 
rather, the exchange serves efficiency purposes and “is in the mutual interest 
of the parties.”112 
Williamson’s key insight is that the efforts made by one party to adhere 
to an agreement are influenced by their counterparty’s incentives.113 To 
 
105 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (presenting the modern hostage-exchange model). 
106 Id. at 519. 
107 Id. at 537. 
108 Id. at 519. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 528 (italics omitted).  
111 Id. at 519; see also Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain 
Commitment in Distribution Channels, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 18, 20 (1992) (explaining “how 
parties can paradoxically strengthen a relationship by ‘tying their hands’”). 
112 See Williamson, supra note 105, at 538. 
113 See id. at 520; see also Christina Ahmadjian & Joanne Oxley, Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change: Dependence Balancing and Partial Equity Stakes in Japanese Automotive Supply Relationships, 22 
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describe the effect more plainly, posting a hostage gives party A an incen-
tive to invest fully in the relationship and adhere to the preliminary agree-
ment—an incentive that is observable by party B. Accordingly, party B may 
invest fully in the relationship, knowing that party A’s performance is more 
likely. Although Williamson’s analysis focuses on investments specific to the 
context of buyer–supplier relationships, he acknowledged at the outset that 
economic hostage exchanges are “widespread.”114 He also recognized that a 
party’s incentive to safeguard bilateral contracts through hostage exchanges 
“is a function of the efficacy of court adjudication” in the sort of transaction 
involved. 115  Thus, when courts are incapable of effectively adjudicating 
claims related to a particular type of transaction, parties to those transac-
tions are more likely to use hostage exchanges to safeguard their agreement.  
B. LOIs as a Form of Hostage Exchange 
Precontractual agreements present an ideal scenario for hostage ex-
changes because American courts have struggled to effectively enforce them. 
Negotiating parties in a precontractual situation often desire a credible 
commitment that their counterparties will invest fully in the relationship. 
This desire is often expressed in LOIs through terms requiring that the 
parties use “best efforts” or negotiate “in good faith” to consummate a final 
deal. However, these terms carry little practical effect because courts are not 
realistically capable of enforcing them. Courts cannot be expected to 
accurately reconstruct the negotiation process ex post and determine 
whether a party used “best efforts” or acted with subjective “good faith.” 
But by exchanging hostages, parties in precontractual negotiations are able 
to achieve the result sought through “good faith” and “best efforts” clauses: 
a credible commitment that they are mutually invested in the relationship. 
An LOI permits such a hostage exchange to occur. 
How do LOIs create this economic hostage exchange? In the traditional 
hostage-exchange scenario, party A gives something of value to party B, 
which B may destroy if A does not live up to his end of the bargain. In the 
LOI scenario, party A gives party B the right to sue based on the LOI if A 
does not comply with its terms. Party B gives party A a reciprocal right by 
also committing to the LOI. Even if the parties do not intend the LOI to 
be binding, case law demonstrates that there is no assurance this intent will 
 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 215 (2006) (summarizing the key insights of Williamson’s hostage-
exchange model). 
114 See Williamson, supra note 105, at 537. 
115 Id. at 521. 
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be recognized by a court. Thus, each side exposes itself to the possibility of 
uncertain legal repercussions for noncompliance. In this way, an LOI 
expands the parties’ relationship by creating a state of reciprocal exposure. 
While the parties are not bound by a formal contract, they are left with a 
higher level of commitment to the relationship than they had prior to 
signing the LOI. Walking away without fear of consequence is no longer an 
option—an LOI permanently changes each party’s calculus in assessing 
whether to terminate negotiations. 
Of course, that calculus is not easy to assess. Neither party to an LOI 
knows the precise value of the hostage they hold because the legal system 
makes the effect of an LOI uncertain, as the discussion in Section I.B 
explains. If one party sues on the LOI—assuming an expected-value 
analysis116 is conducted—the probability of an adverse ruling to either side 
is effectively 50%. This probability presents no challenge to an expected-
value calculation itself, but the difficulty of ascribing values to the possible 
range of outcomes makes reliance on the expected-value calculation more 
troublesome. The case law summarized in subsection I.B.3 demonstrates 
that the range of possible damages awards in a dispute over an LOI is 
particularly wide, which changes the perceived risk of noncompliance.117 
The effect of this extreme legal uncertainty is that noncompliance with the 
LOI appears riskier to both sides, which in turn makes it more likely the 
parties will comply with the terms of the agreement.118 
A simple illustration may clarify this point. Assume that party A and 
party B are negotiating a merger. They sign an LOI agreeing to the price 
and transactional form, yet leave major terms to be decided. The LOI also 
contains stated obligations for the parties to continue negotiations “in good 
faith” and use their “best efforts” to consummate the deal. If party C 
approaches party A with a more favorable offer, how would party A assess 
its ability to walk away from negotiations with party B in light of the LOI 






116 See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real 
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1272-73 (2006) (providing a summary of the basic 
expected-value model in the context of litigation). 
117 See P.V. Viswanath, Risk and Return, PACE U., http://webpage.pace.edu/pviswanath/notes/ 
corpfin/risknret.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (explaining the relationship between risk and the 
variance in possible returns). 
118 This assumes that both parties are risk averse. 
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(1) Party B does not sue on the LOI. 70% $0 $0 
(2) Party B sues on the LOI, and the 
court finds it is not binding.
15% $0 $0 
(3) Party B sues on the LOI, and the 
court finds it is binding. 
15% $10 million $1.5 million 
Total   $1.5 million 
 
Therefore, assuming the values above can be predicted with accuracy, 
party A has posted an economic hostage of $1.5 million by signing the LOI. 
To walk away from negotiations with party B, not only would party C’s offer 
need to be at least $1.5 million more attractive than the deal with party B, 
but party A would also need to have considerable confidence in the expected 
cost of Scenario 3 before it could rely on its comparison of both options.  
But valuing Scenario 3 is not as simple as the example above may suggest. 
Clearly defined legal entitlements provide parties with “bargaining chips” 
that permit a reliable comparison of strategic alternatives.119 However, when 
rules of law yield uncertain outcomes, parties cannot accurately estimate the 
value of their legal entitlements, and outcomes become increasingly subject 
to the “unfettered discretion” of the court. 120 In these cases, ascribing 
reliable values to the components of the expected-value calculation becomes 
extremely difficult. In the case of LOIs, the challenge is compounded by the 
wide range of possible damage awards available to litigants. This variance 
increases the perceived riskiness of noncompliance; therefore, noncompli-
ance becomes less attractive to risk-averse parties.121 
For example, suppose in the example above that instead of a single Scenario 
3 with a 15% probability of occurring, there were instead 15 separate scenarios 
(Scenarios 3 through 17), each with a 1% probability of occurring. Suppose 
that the cost in Scenario 3 is $3 million, and the cost increases by $1 million 
in each scenario to a maximum of $17 million in Scenario 17. While the 
 
119 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (“The legal rules governing alimony, child 
support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain claims based on what each would 
get if the case went to trial.”). 
120 Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983). 
121 See Peter Carr & Liuren Wu, Variance Risk Premiums, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1311, 1312-13 
(2009) (explaining that an increase in variance also produces an increase in risk). 
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expected cost of breach would remain $1.5 million, the increased range of 
possible outcomes would appear to render a breach riskier, and therefore 
less attractive to risk-averse actors. Faced with such a scenario, party A will 
discount the expected value of a deal with party C to reflect this increased 
risk.122 The LOI has effectively destroyed any perceived value of noncom-
pliance. Strategic behavior has now become more difficult and less attrac-
tive, and ultimately, the parties are more likely to adhere to the LOI. This 
result, with its reciprocal effect on both parties, is possible precisely because 
of the legal uncertainty surrounding LOIs.123  
In effect, LOIs’ most beneficial quality—that they make final deals more 
likely to occur—results from what lawyers perceive to be their most unattrac-
tive quality: their legal uncertainty. As has been demonstrated, an LOI 
manipulates this legal uncertainty to make strategic behavior more difficult, to 
align the parties’ interests, and to make a final deal more likely. This conclu-
sion is supported by an economic analysis using a hostage-exchange model.  
CONCLUSION 
LOIs are fraught with contradiction. They are loved, yet hated; binding, 
yet nonbinding; beneficial, yet “ruinous.” This Comment expands the 
understanding of how these contradictory devices operate by viewing them 
through the lens of the hostage-exchange theory. This theory provides a 
much-needed explanation of how LOIs interact with the American legal 
system, despite that system’s inability to deal with them in a consistent way.  
 
122 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 116, at 1272-73 (explaining that increased risk or un-
certainty of a future return is expressed through changes in the relevant discount rate). 
123 The conclusion that legal uncertainty limits a party’s ability to act strategically is recog-
nized in other bargaining theories. For example, theorists frequently state that effective negotia-
tors begin negotiations with a concept of what they can hope for if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement. This is called the party’s “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA). See 
Benjamin L. Snowden, Student Article, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the 
Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 173 (2005) (describing the 
BATNA concept and how it affects parties’ behavior in a negotiation). When litigation is a 
potential result of failed negotiations, knowledge of background law is critical to a party’s 
determination of its BATNA. Id. at 186. But when background law is highly uncertain—as is the 
law surrounding LOIs—a reliable BATNA cannot be determined, and a party is thus restrained in 
its ability to know whether walking away from negotiations would be more beneficial than 
continuing to negotiate. Id. This reduces the ability to act strategically. In other words, highly 
uncertain background law makes an “efficient breach” assessment extremely difficult to perform. 
See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the 
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 406 (2005) (finding, in the context of prelimi-
nary injunctions, that efficient breach is more difficult to rely on when the legal rule is less clear).  
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In sum, an LOI pushes parties closer to a final deal by fundamentally 
changing their relationship with one another. Through the exchange of 
uncertain legal entitlements, the parties intentionally create a state of 
reciprocal exposure to uncertain legal outcomes. In doing so, the parties 
align their interests, communicate credible commitments to each other, and 
reduce their ability to act strategically. Ultimately, LOIs allow parties to use 
legal uncertainty to their mutual benefit. 
 
